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Abstract
During the early days of Internet it was widely defended that being in an on-line environ-
ment clearly transformed some human rights; and might even create new ones. We argue for
the consideration of an Internet Bill of Rights (IBR) however rather than inventing new rights,
we propose that some rights have to be reconsidered within the emerging virtual context. Pri-
vacy, anonymity, freedom of expression, and so are not exactly the same rights we have in the
realm of our physical being. What changes are some inarticulate contextual conditions, which
make some people think that rights are actually changing. This has theoretical implications.
We attempt to show that there is no need to re-think rights like privacy from the beginning,
or even eliminate it, as some scholars propose. It also has implications for policy making, as it
provides a general methodology to consider and adapt to virtual contexts in order to assure
that basic human rights can be correctly applied and defended in cyberspace.
Key words: digital technologies, information society, privacy, virtual versus real, new rights.
Resumen. ¿Necesitamos nuevos derechos en el ciberespacio? El caso de cómo definir la privacidad
en línea en una declaración de derechos de Internet
Durante los primeros días de Internet, era común defender que formar parte de un entorno
en línea claramente transformaría los derechos humanos, incluso podría crear nuevos. En este
texto, queremos argumentar que, a la hora de establecer un Bill of Rights, o declaración de dere-
chos en Internet, en lugar de definir nuevos derechos, necesitamos reconsiderar los que ya exis-
ten dentro del emergente contexto virtual. La privacidad, el anonimato o la libertad de expre-
sión, entre otros, no son exactamente los mismos derechos que tenemos en el reino de lo real.
Lo que cambia son ciertas condiciones contextuales no articuladas, que hacen pensar a algunos
que son los derechos los que han cambiado. Ello tiene ciertas implicaciones teóricas. Intenta-
mos mostrar que no hay ninguna necesidad de repensar derechos como la privacidad desde el
principio, ni mucho menos eliminarlos, como algunos analistas proponen. Igualmente, tiene
implicaciones para el desarrollo de políticas, ya que ofrece una metodología general para ser
considerada y adaptada a los contextos virtuales, para así poder asegurar que los derechos huma-
nos básicos pueden ser correctamente aplicados y defendidos en el ciberespacio.
Palabras clave: tecnologías digitales, sociedad de la información, privacidad, intimidad,
virtual versus real, nuevos derechos.
Sumary
Why we need an Internet Bill of Rights
When the first philosophical essays started to consider Cyberspace, most
were fascinated by that famous oximoron of «virtual reality» and start to
dream about how life and being would change. Sherry Turkle (1997) analysed
how the possibility to create several on-line identities might change our
whole approach to live. Other authors like Rheingold (2000), Haraway
(1985), Hayles (1999) or Grey (2002) made similar claims about society,
gender, arts or politics. However, cyberright activists as well as scholars who
were more interested in applied issues like Lessig (2000), Castells (1996),
Livraghi (2000) or Jenkins and Thorburn (2003) prefered to stick to a more
conservative analysis and outlook. They find many similarities and little dif-
ferences between being in real life and in the on-line world. A common
quasi-proverb of those law and ethics pioneer days was: «What is legal in
real life should be legal on the internet. What is illegal in real life should be
ilegal in Cyberspace».
Only a few people still believe in the revolutionary transformations expressed
by e.g. Barlow’s (1996) utopian Declaration of the Independence of Cyber-
space. Largescale profan everyday use has watered down a lot the utopian claims
from the optimistic pioneers. The debate continues deploying the methodol-
ogy and argumentation of applied philosophy. Even when we accept that prag-
matic line of simply interpreting cyber activity in the same legal system, there
are various contextual factors unique to Cyberspace that have to be under-
stood and dealt with.
Clearly, as more and more people live (partially) in Cyberspace, the urgency
to properly understand how Human Rights can be protected in this virtual
realm grows. In order to create a Human Rights based regime (Jørgensen,
2006) in cyberspace, in which netizens are protected against arbitrary action of
system operators of public sites, as well as public institutions as such1 an Inter-
net Bill of Rights is needed in order to clarify and in some cases extend the
established Human Rights, taking the particularities of cyberspace into con-
sideration. How this Internet Bill of Rights should look like, what type of
questions should it address and in which way are the main subjects of this
paper.
Why we need an Internet Bill of Rights
The clash of rights in cyberspace
From ideal to real: the case of cryptography
Conclusion
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1. It is our understanding that the ratification and implementation of the proposed Bill of
Rights would be initially voluntary and let by public institutions.
The clash of rights in cyberspace
It is understood that in Cyberspace in some aspects unprecedented axiological
dilemmas emerged, and hence there is a need for defining a new normative frame-
work which complements the existing Human Rights. A dilemma arises whenever
there competing values create a paradoxical situation in which all possible solutions
neglect at least one legitimate claim, demanding for a establishment of priorities.
Being the result of the work of educated and civilized scientists, cyberspace
emerged embodying liberal norms and values that evolved in auto-regulatory
practices. Additionally we can observe the non-neglectible influence of the
cultural movement happening especially in the very active Bay area during the
sixties, which accompanied the de-regulatory and participatory processes.
While the advantages of auto-regulation, and especially its adequacy in con-
sideration of the changing conditions due to the fast technological develop-
ment of cyberspace, are recognized, it is our intention to argue for the benefit
of developing the architecture of international agreements dealing with the
multitude of aspects that need to be organized (e.g. security, e-business, SPAM,
etc.), based on constitutionally stipulated (traditional) Human Rights, illus-
trated and complimented by guidelines dealing with special conditions of
cyberspace. Or put differently, we recognize auto-regulation as the most agile
regulation method, but some issues (as defined by the Working Group on
Internet Governance2) are not likely to be taken up by private actors or are
likely to be resolved unjustly as the lobby interest of the private sector clash
with those of the public (civil society). It is for those cases that global solu-
tions, political institutions such as a Bill of Rights is needed to enable delib-
eration and consensual agreement for how to find fair arbitration.
The following lists some examples for specific cases of clashes between
rights in cyberspace3:
— Freedom of expression versus minority rights (hate and racist speech).
— Economy of attention model (Google, Yahoo, and their economic model
of selling ads based on the profile of user) versus privacy of users.
— Right to know (Hackers and computer scientists) versus right to privacy
(server administrators and owners).
— Right to know (Hackers and computer scientists) versus copyright and
patent rights of companies and creators.
— Right to have our equipment protected (computer security) versus the right
of companies to keep their code secret in order to hold their copyright and
patent rights.
— Anonimity in cyberspace for users versus the need to identify oneself in
e-commerce transactions.
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2. <http://www.wgig.org/docs/book/Appendix_II.html.>
3. Some of the dilemmas are due to the specific conditions of cyberspace — like the non-availa-
bility of identity cards as verification of maturity, others like the securing of and limits to pri-
vacy in the eye of public interest have a long history and are traditionally much disputed issues.
— National security (tracking cybercriminals, terrorists, and so on) versus pri-
vacy of users.
— Right to cryptography (privacy of users, trustability of e-commerce oper-
ations) versus the need to know for government agencies.
— Freedom of expression versus trustability of media (both mass media as
well as independent media, including blogers).
— Right to access (including p2p networks) versus fight against piracy.
As it is commonly done in most human rights literature, all these prob-
lems can best be solved by developing some sort of «rights ranking» which
may let us know, case by case, which right is more important, always based
on a context. There are no magic solutions like: «Freedom of expression is
more important than privacy». Instead a careful analysis of context is always
needed. However, it is important to assume that some sort of ranking is nec-
essary and that, therefore, sometimes, some user right might have to be tem-
porary cancelled in order to protect a higher right from another user. From
that point of view there are no methodological differences between internet
and real life, so we won’t continue analysing this here. In this contribution to
the discourse about an Internet Bill of Rights we attempt to establish the neces-
sity for such a proposition which allows for a mutual settlement regarding
dilemmas inherent in social systems created in cyberspace.
Is it really needed then? What point are we trying to make when arguing
for an Internet Bill of Rights? The meaningfulness and possibilities of an inter-
net governance system is not far-fetched. It seems adequate at this point to
stress the relevance of the pioneering multi-stakeholder approach to internet gov-
ernance as a precedent for the collective management of global Common Pub-
lic Pool Resources (CPPR, Ostrom, 1990) like physical logistical infrastruc-
ture or potable water. The case of internet governance is un-precedented in
its mode of participation, but at the same time participants (especially the new
players of civil society) should prudently respect and embrace the experience
the traditional negotiators of international agreements contribute to the process.
Valuable insights can be drawn from historical solutions of CPPR and pub-
lic-good management solutions.
Then of course, besides the practical questions of how useful it would be
for a future governance system/commission, there is the methodological issue
of how an Internet Bill of Rights should look like and, specially whether some
rights might dissapear or at least change in a digital context. To properly under-
stand the possible differences the provision of inalienable Human Rights in
Cyberspace two practical prerequisites shall be mentioned.
We agree with the notion that in Cyberspace software code and hardware
properties (the technological gestell 4) are law (Lessig, 2000). Technological
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4. Under technological gestell we understand —following Heiddegger— the soft and hard
infrastructure building cyberspaces environmental conditions and implementing/manifes-
ting the procedural rational of its stakeholders.
gestell describes conditioning factors establishing the rules for being in Cyber-
space. These rules depend on the one hand on the finalities and ideals pur-
sued by its citizens and on the binary feasibility (whether the solution is dig-
itally expressible) on the other hand. The former aspects are traditionally dealt
with in social systems by human institutions negotiating the normative pri-
orities and consensus among conflicting interests, while the search for tech-
nological solutions is informed by and needs to comply with the normative
framework, there is a mutual interdependence between the two. Let us look
at the case of the clash between privacy and e.g. the protection of children
regarding explicit adult content. Some sort of identity management system is
needed in order to verify user age as access condition for this kind of content.
While this normative objection is clear, the need for privacy restrains the pos-
sibilities for such an identity management system. Hence either one right has
to be defined as more important than the other or a technological solution
needs to be found. For these purposes (and once the pure free market model
is ruled out) three closely collaborating institutions can be thought of: one
for the transparent and inclusive discourse about the normative guidelines,
one for the agreement of open standards of the technological, and one for
the arbitration in case of colliding interests and enacted conflicts. In other
words one leading social-normative institution — as presently emerging in
the IGF; one leading standardization institution — as presently embodied
by the IETF and the W3C; and one institution that can be appealed to in
order to judge disputes — as the presently emerging International Criminal
Court to gauge general rights controversies and infringements.
Given the importance of the informational and discoursive function of
cyberspace5 all humans need to be able to access and participate. Subsequently
it makes sense to conceptualize cyberspace as a global public good or common
public resource. The former resulting in a right to access the later in the need
for fair spectrum distribution mechanism allowing for allocation of spectrum
considering all stakeholders legitimate rights and not based on monetary com-
petition6. While political agreements (negotiated in a multi-stakeholder dis-
course) are necessary for the spectrum distribution, governmental investment
is needed in order to provide adequate public access points for citizens. Put
differently all humans should have a right to non-competitive minimal access
to cyberspace.
While markets based provision of internet bandwidth access has evolved
as effective modus operandi and the price differentiation of bandwidth pro-
vided serves as incentive to push performance improvements, network neu-
trality represents an essential condition for creating a just discourse environment,
enabling debate without biasing the deliberation process through content dis-
crimination based on wealth based power. Hence network neutrality shall be
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5. Understood as the converged sphere comprised of todays internet, television and telepho-
ne networks.
6. See CRIS campaign for more information on fair spectrum distribution.
a condition defined and stipulated in the Bill of Rights. By Network neutral-
ity (equivalently «net neutrality», «internet neutrality» or «NN») we should
understand a principle applied to residential broadband networks, and poten-
tially to all broadband networks. Precise definitions vary, but a broadband net-
work free of restrictions on the kinds of equipment attached and the modes
of communication allowed would be considered neutral by most advocates,
provided it met additional tests relating to the degradation of various com-
munication streams by others. Arguably, no network is completely neutral,
hence neutrality represents for some an ideal condition toward which networks
and their operators may strive. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_neu-
trality]
Another issue already touched upon is the right to privacy that is various
times in conflict with commercial and security interests. Here personal liber-
ty and privacy are assessed to be axiologically dominant. As defined in the
Human Rights, all individuals have a right to privacy. This right shall include
ownership of produced data as well as the right to cryptography, as is the more
feasible solution to protect personal data in the open architecture that Internet
has today. In practical terms this translates into the obligation to inform about
the act and kind of data recorded as well as to anonymization or optional
removal of personal data trails (data shadow).
Last but not least let us consider the complex of issues involved in the right
to freedom of expression. As raised above there are dilemmas with the rights and
responsibilities of a platform provider being in conflict with the rights to access
and free expression. As implicitly stated in the right to privacy everybody has
the right to private conversation and thus everybody has the right to create
and participate in exclusive private environments. In contrast sites open to
the public shall provide public cyber rights and comply with public norms.
While the actual content falls under freedom of expression maturity has to
be established and discussion possibly including (democratic) collective
assessment regarding the nature of the content would certainly improve the
informational hygiene while not infringing heterogeneity and liveliness. The
first problem of anonymous verification of certain identity aspects like age
seems to be feasible through solutions like shibboleth identity management.
For the second dilemma we would like to contribute a scenario framing a
solution.
Lets imagine the institution managing the cyber address assignment includes
meta-information regarding the content of the information and service pro-
vided. This would enable, for example, the classification of content to be only
appropriate for mature users as well as the insertion of a informative page advis-
ing the user of the quality of the content. This upstream page would also allow
for public discourse and collective assessment of content provided at the site.
This way there is no enforcement of particular axiological dispositions in the
form of restraining the freedom of expression but vulgar and extremist con-
tent would be classified and debated.
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From ideal to real: the case of cryptography
In an ideal world, the right to privacy would be protected by an entity with
full understanding of the priorities of rights and capable in each situation to
decide which right is more important. This entity also needed total knowl-
edge of the context to be considered in order to produce the ethically correct
or at least most suitable solution. Because this is impossible from a practical
point of view, the basic need is to find a middle way between autoregulation
and institutionalized control. The Internet Bill of Rights should therefore pri-
marlily declare cyber-contextualized Human Rights, and then leave the concrete
institution building and practices for policing the rights to a separate discourse.
In this section, we will make an extensive use of real life (that is, non dig-
ital) examples of privacy to build our notions of how to deal with privacy and
establish why cryptography is important for that right. The main reason is
precisely that our intuitions on how privacy should hold in a virtual world are
still too young to be trustable.
A first step in this direction is to distinguish privacy from the concept of
secretism. Privacy is not about keeping something dangerous or even crimi-
nal hidden in order to avoid prosecution. That is the reason that a terrorist, a
drug dealer or peadophile might exploit cryptography: to keep their criminal
actions hidden from public view. But this is not privacy; this is secrecy. There-
fore, the common argument from some governments stating something in the
line of: «Hmmm… So you need cryptography you say? What is it what you
are trying to hide?» is completely unacceptable.
Then we must distinguish —from a psychological point of view— priva-
cy from intimacy. Privacy is a more general subject, that simply states the right
of the citizen to decide when a third person has access to his/her own com-
munication, documents purchases in the Internet no matter whether they are
of an «intimate» nature in a psychological term.
One of the main arguments to prohibit cryptography is precisely that it
can be use for secretism. This is certainly true: terrorist, drug dealers, pae-
dophiles and other classic evils that the press likes to imagine roaming free in
the wilderness of Internet do use cryptography to hide their criminal actions.
The question is not if cryptography can be misused. Of course it can be mis-
used. Email can also be misused to send death threats, hate speech, or viruses,
but no one is asking to forbid email. So the question is: is cryptography main
use secrecy or is it just one possibility among many more rational uses? Mov-
ing to real world; cryptography is like shades we use at home for privacy but
can also be used for secrecy? Or is it more like entering a bank wearing a ski-
mask which will inmediately trigger all alarms? We argue that the first case is
true: it is very difficult to imagine an online world without some sort of cryp-
tography.
The next step is to realize that most internet-related rights (and that includes
of course privacy) are very context dependent. The right to live shouldn’t be
dependent of any context (despite the fact that some countries which have
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death penalty think otherwise). However, the right to privacy is clearly depen-
dent on contexts. Here are some:
It depends on:
— The way the law views a particular individual: my right to talk on the
phone or to send an e-mail to someone else without a third party eaves-
dropping my conversation is not absolute; a judge might consider that I’m
a criminal and therefore produce a warrant to get my phone or email con-
versations monitored.
— It depends on the will of the owner of the right. I might decide to keep
my e-mail hidden from third persons but I also might decide to freely pub-
lish it in the Internet.
— It depends on where I am: If I’m at home, with windows closed, no one
knows what I am doing, but if I’m in the middle of a crowded square this
privacy is lost.
— It depends on an identification process. Let’s return to the crowded square.
Even if people see what I’m doing in that crowded square, if that crowded
square is in a foreign country in which nobody knows me, I still retain
much of my privacy, as they might see what I’m doing, but nobody knows
who I really am.
Clearly, privacy is created after a psychological process, and depends on
culture. Despite some exceptions, like kamikazes, it is very difficult to find a per-
son or a culture in which living is not considered a supreme value. However,
several philosophers and historians do believe that the concept of privacy was
inexistent before the middle ages, and there are even cultures today that do
not seem to consider privacy at all.
In 2000, in an invited talk to the Computers, Freedom and Privacy Meet-
ing, eminent science-fiction writer Neal Stephenson argued for the existence of
several models to react to privacy attacks. Basicly, he stated that citizens worry
about their privacy when there are no more basic rights at stake. They need
to feel safe. When the environment suddenly turns dangerous, citizens might
still not accept a «big brother» model, but might feel comfortable in the idea
of a multiple vigilance system in which the process of control is distributed
among several organisations. For example, instead of an onmimode police
state, you can have your neighbourhood controled by a private security com-
pany, the city police to guard the streets, another private company in charge of
security in airports, and so on. Stephenson calls this model a «domination sys-
tem» following the ideas of the christian pacifist Walter Wink (2000). What
interests us more here is the idea that:
a) the value we give to privacy might change depending on the context: if
suddenly our neighborhood becomes a dangerous place due to a rise in
crime, probably our concerns about privacy will start to evaporate and we
won’t mind anymore the idea of having a third party asking for an ID to any-
one trying to reach our neighborhood.
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b) Despite the fact that both are attacks to our privacy, we consider more
agravating a «big brother» model than a «domination system». Both facts
really imply the dependence of psychological process and contexts to under-
stand privacy properly.
In a similar venue we can consider Brin (1998) and his idea of the «trans-
parent society». According to Brin, privacy nowadays is impossible: e.g. streets
are full of cameras recording our movements in the public space. All our move-
ments in the Internet can and in fact are recorded in several servers. Our emails
can be easily read by the system administrator. But, this might be after all a
good thing, because technology gives the possiblity to counterattack using the
same coin. We can use video-cameras to record police commiting abuse of
authority —like the (in)famous Rodney King case; hackers can use their knowl-
edge to enter in databases of the governments to show the world unaceptable
operations. So he argues for what others have called «radical transparency»
(Wired, 2007), the positive effects that complete public disclosure leads to
more ethical conduct. Brin position might be somewhat naive, but both
Stephenson and Brin shows us how dependent of public perceptions of possible
threads and replies to that thread might change completely our view of what
is privacy and whether we have a right to it, after all.
Another interesting aspect is how the threat to our privacy depends great-
ly on the way it is produced. It is interesting to observe how much more peo-
ple worry about surveillance cameras and a lot less about getting their com-
munication being monitored on the Internet. A free email account is enough
for lots of people to give away their privacy; and some preview of porn might
be enough to open your computer to malware which might be used in the
future to register your movements in the WWW. However, people feel usual-
ly uncomfortable in the presence of a camera. There are several opposing move-
ments to the use of cameras for surveillance purposes, even artists groups, like
the performers Surveillance Camera Players (SVC, 2007) or the Steve Mann’s
projects about «Subjectrights» in which everybody is invited to record securi-
ty cameras with their own cameras, following Brin’s philosophy (Mann, 2007).
Once all this information is reviewed we can consider, what type of right
is privacy? Our proposal is that if we just move privacy from the real world to
the Internet we might be forgetting something. Because most rights depends
on context, we can evaluate a right as long as we consider the context. But
what if we have a context that is so ubicuous that consider it for granted? If
we move to a very unfamiliar territory (as it is moving from real life to Inter-
net) we might suddenly discover that the facts that we consider for granted
do not longer hold. Does that mean that «new rights» emerge? Not al all; it
only means that we are not giving proper attention to the context elements as
it should be.
The philosopher of language John Perry (1993) has an excelent term to
consider this problem. He calls it, the «inarticulate element». An inarticulate
element is some piece of world information that doesn’t show up in a conver-
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sation, because the context grants it, but without it the sentence the uttering
is not meaningful. One example is the concept of «time zone». When I ask a
person in the bar: «What time is it?» and she replies «It’s seven thirty» all the con-
versation has an inarticulate element embebbed: «What time is it [in this time-
zone]?». Of course, it would be quite silly if she double checked: «Hmmm..
sure! In what time zone are you interested?» But the fact that this element is after
all meaningful can be easily seen when we consider another normal conversa-
tion like:
1) Hmmm… I should call him, but wait. Do you know what time is it in
New York right now?
Here the inarticulate element becomes articulate: we are asking for time
in an specific time zone. Now let’s move to the Internet. Two people are
chatting and decide to continue the talk later. They propose a time:
2) Ok. We should meet again. What about tomorrow at 13.00?
However, they connect at different times and don’t meet after all because
they didn’t realise that they were in two different time zones. Does it mean
that Internet creates a «new time» or that we need to revise our concept of
time? Not all all, it is just Internet doesn’t guarantee anymore the fact that
two people having a conversation are actually in the same time zone. You
need to articulate that element in order to assure proper results. And this
is what an Internet Bill of Rights could facilitate.
In the case of privacy we have several inarticulate elements in the real world
which we need to consider: We know that in a foreign city it is quite unlike-
ly that people will recognize us. We assume that a letter enclosed in an envel-
op will only be read by the author, the adresee and the people that he or author
decides to share the letter with. We almost never consider such elements unless
the situation is strange enough to obligue us to do so. We are in a foreign city
but we know that some neighbours are also there on holiday, so we take extra
precautions in order not to encounter them; we know that the mail system in
a country is not trustable, so we never use it to send sensitive information
about us.
Internet challenges all these assumptions. Internet desarticulates the inar-
ticulated elements we consider for granted. That doesn’t mean that digital
technologies make privacy impossible, as Brin claims. Neither does it imply
that we need to consider to invent a new right. Far from it. It only means that
conditions are different and that we need to reconsider them before talking
about securing the right to privacy on the Internet Therefore, an Internet Bill
of Rights should include:
1. A list of rights depending on their importancy, stating which one should be
prevail and why in a clash situation.
2. What are the key inarticulated elements that define a right in any given
real life situation and which of those inarticulated elements do no longer
hold in a digital technology context.
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3. An instrument or series of instruments, legal, political, technological, or
otherwise that reintroduces those inarticulated elements into play, and
guarantee that the rights hold in a similar way.
In the case of privacy, the instrument that is most likely to work to assure
we have our inarticulated conditions back is cryptography. Why is that? Let’s
review what we have discussed so far.
As we said before, privacy depends on several contextual elements. One is
the relation to identification. In the real world I have several elements that
allow me to consider that I can be identified or not. As we said before, I’m in
a foreign city and nobody knows me, or I’m at home with all the windows
closed, so I can’t be seen at all. But then, there are some situations in which I
know I can be clearly identified. I’m in the balcony of my appartment, or I
enter my favorite pub, the one I’ve been visiting for years. By changing the
context I (partially unconsciously) decide whether to identify me or not, and
then act accordingly. Cryptography using the public and private key system
gives me the ability to sign a message so the recipient can check whether it is
actually from me or not (For more information about the subject see Schneier,
1993).
When cryptography is used commonly when navigating through the WWW
or when sending emails, it gives us the same security that real life gives us de
facto. We don’t use cryptography at home to talk to our spouses because we
know that nobody is listening. That condition -that inarticulate element- does-
n’t hold in the Internet, so we need to use an instrument to return that inar-
ticulate element back.
Cryptography also gives the «object» to think about when we ponder about
our privacy online. Some years ago, almost every privacy activist and lots of
people concerned with their privacy in a digital context used to sign their emails.
This probably didn’t make much sense in principle, as very few people actually
did have cryptography like PGP installed in their computers, and only a few
of them actually checked the identity of the sender. But as psychological way
of making the subject of privacy known among other users it worked quite
well, in the same way as a camera staring at us while we are walking freely in
the street gives an eerie feeling.
Now we can also understand why the visions from Brin or Stephenson are
wrong or at least only partially right: The main reason that privacy is at dan-
ger is not the technology per se. Technology is neither good, nor bad, nor neu-
tral. The main reason we have the feeling that privacy is dissapearing or that it
is obsolete (as Brin claims), is that the traditional conditions do not longer
hold. Simply because they are inarticulate makes it difficult to realise.
Conclusion
We have presented privacy as our main example, but it is easy to see now
how the concept of inarticulate elements can help to analyse some of the
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other dilemmas specific to cyberspace we list in the beginning. Surprisingly
enough —or maybe not— most of them depend on identification process-
es, so therefore they depend on some sort of crptographic system. Entering a
shop and showing my ID should be enough in most cases to assure that I
am who I state to be and the clerk can use my credit card to charge me. On
the Internet I need to re-introduce this inarticulate element called «visual
recognition» by some sort of cryptographic element, plus maybe biometrics.
Again, in a world in which publishing was expensive a net of reviewers assured
or at least provided some intersubjectivity that could at least guarantee us
that a publisher —or the director of the newspaper, or a peer review, etc. did
check the credibility of the declarations. In case some falsity was introduced
in the information we were receiving there was some company or organiza-
tion to complain. We need to create similar systems in order to assure cred-
ibility of the information distributed plus some sort of identification scheme
to recognize that the certificate stating that this information is trustable, gen-
erated by so and so, has been really generated by so and so. Again, using cryp-
tography.
The right to know dilemmas usually depend on some sort of identification
type also (Are you really a scholar doing a serious research) and again, we can
revert to the old conditions (the inarticulate element) using cryptography.
However, cryptography is not the only instrument, and not all rights can be
guarded using just this measure. A clear example is freedom of speech versus
minority rights: here a key technological element might be information retrieval
systems, which can be used to detect hate speech and then some sort of legal
protocol to obligue the providers of service to remove such type of hostile
speech in case that minority rights in this context are more important than
freedom of speech of the offenders. And again one of the first steps an Inter-
net Bill of Rights can contribute is to help define what is a private and what a
public space online.
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